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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EMIL

~CHOCKNMYER,

Plaintiff,
vs.

T H E IND US TRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and KAISER STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendants.

Case No.
11451

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
KAISI<~H R'l EEL CORPORATION
1

NATURE OF THE CASE
'l'his is a review, as provided by Section 35-1-83
F tah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, of an order of
the Indnstrial Commission of Utah, dated November
1:1, l9G8, dmying plaintiff's claim for compensation on
tlw gronnds that the claim was barred by the statutes
of limitation and/or foreclosed by his failure to appeal
horn a final order of the Commission denying his claim.

1

DISPOSITION BELOvV
The Commission denied plaintiff's claim as being
(1) foreclosed by his failure to appeal from a final order
denying his claim, and/or (2) barred bv the statute of
limitations, Section 35-1-99 Ftah Code Annotated, 19:i3.
RELIEF SOUGH'J' ON APPEAL
Defendants ask that this Court uphold the findings
and order of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FAC'rS
The plaintiff unquestionably sustained lllJUI"Y m
the course of his employment with the defendant Kaiser
Stee1 Coq)Oration on June 19, 1958. In view of the fact
that the claim currentl>- before the court '''as denied
by the Commis,sion on limitations of actions principles,
it is not entirely appropriate to review the medical
aspects of the claim. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's brief
is devoted entirely to a review of his symptoms and a
statement of his contention that, whether or not there
have been technical deficiencies in the presentation of
his claim from time to time, he now suffers disability h:v·
reason of industrial accident. It is at least relevant,
therefore, to point out that all medical prohl0ms i11 connection with J\Ir. Schocknmycr's claim \Yen' refoned to a
medical panel, constituted as provided by Section 35-1-77
Utah Code Annotated 1D33, on April 4, 19Gl. The panel
issued its report on May 12, 1961 (Record pages ():2
through G6) in which it stated, among others, its conclusions that "this panel is unable to relate this appli2

cant's low back probk•m to his industrial injuries, :::;tudies
or treatment," and "then~ is no permanent disability as
a resnlt of these injuries."
Tlw plaintiff objected to the findings of the medical
pmwl, and hearing on the objections was held on Octnher 2, 1961 at which time the plaintiff was given an
opportnnit~- to t>xarni1w the panel chairman at length
and to Jffesent any other medical testimony he desired.
'!'hereafter the reterf'e filed his findings that the plaintiff',, IH'ohkms wrrc not the result of industrial injury,
nnd the Connnil'ision denied the claim. The order was
dat1·d October 2G, 1961 (Record page 130). No appeal
from that decision ~was ever taken nor was application
for rehearing or reviFw filed within the period required
h~- f-lection 35-1-82 lTtah Code Annotated as it read at
tlH· time the order denying the claim was issued.
On August 9, 1962 (Record page 142) a new claim
seeking compensation for disability related to patholot-,ry attrihutablP to injury of June 19, 1958 was filed
with the Industrial Commission. No formal order was
c•11t<•rpd in response to that application, but the plainti l'f and his attorneys were advised that the Commission
had eoncludf'd it had no statutory authority to reopent ht· elaim (Record liage 150). Nevertheless, by reason of
tl:1· plaintiff',, persistence in asserting his claim through
t:1P offices of two goyernors and Utah's congressional
(1(·legati on, the mattPr was scheduled for reconsideration,
nnd a prP-trial conference was held on August 8, 1968.
Plaintiff's attorney was then given thirty days within
\\ 1. ielt to snhmit a nwmorandmn on the jurisdiction and
3

statutes of limitation (1m·stions (Ht>cord vage 1G8). On
September 10, 1968, plaintiff was advised that no memorandum had been submitted and that, unless one werr
::mhrnitted within ten days, it would he concluclt•d that
plaintiff dt>sired to submit tlw matter on the record.
No memorandum haying been submitted within the additional ten days, the Commission entered its ordt>r on
N ovemher 13, 19G8 denying the plaintiff's claim. It is
of primary significance in considering the subjt•ct claim
that there has been no injnry sustained or claimed to
haye been sustained by the plaintiff since Jnne of 1958.
It is also note>vorth.\- that plaintiff has been represented
by competent connsel at ever.\- stagP of the proceedings.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 26,
1961, THE COJVIMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION
TO CONSIDER THE SUBJECT CLAIM.

1'he original application in this matter was filed
on :March 1, 1961 for injnr.\· sustained on June 19, 1958.
The injury was described as "right shoulder injUl',\'
resulting into ruptured disc in the back; three crushed
discs removed." It appears from that application that
the plaintiff had been paid temporary total disability
compensation or wages from the date of the allegPd
injury until Fehrnary 5, 1960, a }Jeriod of approximately
twentv months. The medical panel concluded that therP
was no permanent disability from the June 19th injury
and that any discernable back pathology could not be
4

attrirmted to the injury. 'L'hese 11wdical conclusions were
adopted as findings of the Commission, and an order
den~-ing co1111wnsation was entered. No appeal \Vas taken.
the application for hearing filed March 1,
l9<il was formally denied after the complete procedure
for administrative consideration had been followed, any
question related to that claim must be considered res
jmlicata. Tlw Comt should require no citation of authorit~· for the proposition that, in the absence of a fraud
11pon the court, no litigant can reopen a claim which
has once heen formally and finally decided after a statutory IH·riod for seeking n'\'iew has expired. In 1961 and
until l9G5, the only procedure for precipitating judicial
n~\-it>w of an order of the Industrial Commission was
thP filing of a petition for review under Section 35-1-82
Utah Code Annotated. No petition for review was ever
filed.
Sincl~

On August 9, 19G2, the plaintiff filed a separate
application for hearing. This application alleged disability resulting from the same injury (the injury of
.f mw 19, 1958) described in the application of .March l,
19Gl. Again, on .January 24, 19G3, the plaintiff filed
an application. This third application for hearing desc.·rihes the same injury of June 19, 1968, and the same
1mtl10logy, disc degmeration, as the previous two ap~
1ilications. We submit that the plaintiff's failure to
ap1wal from the denial of his original application within the thirty-day period then required by Section 35-1-82
Utah CodP Annotated 1953, as amended, completely preelndPd the possibility of administrative or judicial re5

VIPW. 'l'his court so held in State Insurance Fund vs.
Industrial Commissio11, Gl Utah 579 in 1923, and the
conrt has not infrequently restated that position. See
Fcrgnson L'S. I11d1tsfriul Commission, G3 Utah 112, 221
Pac. 1099; Utah F11el Com pa·11y rs. I 11dustrial Commission, 73 Ptah 199, 273 Pac. 30G; W oldlH'rg 1;s. Ind1istrial
Commission, 74 Utah 309, 279 Pac. 609. It is obvious that
an applicant for compensation whose claim has bPen dt'nied and who has filed to st>ek administrative or judicial
revie"· cannot revive the Commission's jurisdiction or
the Court's jurisdiction b:v the simple expedient of filing
a new application. The basic llI"oblem presented by all th('
applications is whether or not disc pathology which required surgical correction resulted from an industrial
accident. This issue was resolved against the applicant
by a medical panel and by the Commission itself. There
was no statutory procedure for reconsideration of this
issu0 once the appeal period has expired. There should
be no such procedure; the principle of res judicata is
as valid in the field of worlunen's compensation as in any
otLer area of lav,,·.
POINT II
DISABILITY PERSISTING MORE THAN SIX
YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF AN INDUSTRIAL
INJURY CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF AN AWARD
FOR TEMPORARY TOTAL AND PERMANENT
PARTIAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION.

The only injnry plaintiff alleges is an injury of
.Tune 19, 1958. On January 23, 19G8, in the case of U.S.
Smelting, illinin9 & Refining Co., vs. Nielse11, 20 Utah
6

:.!cl :.!I 1, ±:)7 P.:..!d rn9, this Comt held that the right to
rece in• com pernm ti on for temporary total and perrnarn·nt partial disability terminates six years after the
date of the injury. In no event, therefore, could the
plaintiff here be awarded compensation for any period
of disahi Ii ty aftt>r .J nne 19, 196±.

CONCLUSION
Tlw plaintiff's brief in this matter is essentially a
l'l'\'i<>w of his symptoms since his injury and an indictHH•nt of the attorneys and physicians who have served
him sinee 1958. The brief does not indicate on what
tlH·ory the i)laintiff predicates his contention that the
Co11rn1i ssion or tlw· Conrt have jurisdiction. We have
attl'llllJtt>d to anticipate the theories which might be advanced and to demonstrate to the Court that no jurisdidion still exists.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
By Frank J. Allen
Attorneys for Defendant
Kaiser Steel Corporation
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